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NOTES.
LAW SCHOOL-NEW

ENTRANCE

REQUIREMENTS-The

Board

of Trustees of the University has recently adopted the following
resolution to go into effect October, 1915:
Requirements for the Fall of 1915 and Thereafter.
All applicants must present the degree of Bachelor of Arts
or an equivalent degree from an approved University or College.
Persons who in the opinion of the Faculty are properly
qualified may be admitted as hearers in one or more subjects.
Such hearers shall not be considered as students, nor shall they
be admitted to an examination, or be eligible for a degree.
This modification of the existing requirements will doubtlessly be regarded by every alumnus and friend of the Law School
as a step in the proper direction. In point of stringency and exactitude
the new requirements probably exceed that of any other institution
devoted to legal instruction. A few other American law schools re(628)
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quire college degrees for admission, but in the announcements of
almost all of them certain exceptions are made, and even among the
strictest it appears that a number of men are admitted who have not
an academic degree.
The action of the Trustees is based upon their conviction that
an efficient preparation for the Bar requires an adequate and broad
college training as a preliminary to legal study. In this respect the
Law School will discharge its duty to the Bar and to its own students. With respect to the latter, the net result of the new requirements will be a surer and better group focus upon sincere and
thorough study of the law. Although the college graduate is not
always the most capable man, nor the brightest student by natural
gifts, yet in general he is more earnest and more faithful in his work.
When the student body is composed of such men not only can more
ground be covered, but also it can be covered more thoroughly and
intelligently. Whatever may be lost by the exclusion of those unfortunate enough not to have had a college training, will be gained
in a better balanced body of students, closely applying themselves
to the purpose for which they are in attendance. For a law school
is to be judged as much by the work and spirit of its students as
by the ability of its faculty. Incidentally it may be confidently expected that the new requirement will lead many men to obtain their
college degree who, otherwise, would be content with a secondary
school training or with one or two years in college.
D.D.S.

THE

ORDER

OF

THE

COIF-ELECTIONS-COMPLETE

LIST OF

MEMBERS-The Pennsylvania Chapter of THE ORDER OF THE COIF
held its annual meeting in April. The principal business was the
election of members from the class of 1914 and the election of officers for the ensuing year.
As related in the LAW REVIEW 1 at the time of the installation of
the local chapter the eligibility of members depends on high standing
in scholarship. No person can b;e elected as an undergraduate member who does not rank among the first ten per cent. of his class
and who has not received honors during some one year of his Law
School work.
The members of the class of 1914 who were "summoned" to
membership in April are: Mr. N. I. S. Goldman, Mr. G. L. Pape,
Mr. Yale L. Schekter, Mr. Douglass D. Storey and Mr. Paul N.
Schaeffer.
The old officers were re-elected for the ensuing year, as follows: Professor Win. E. Mikell, President; Mr. Win. A. Schnader,
Vice-President; and Mr. L. P. Scott, No. 6oi Morris Building, Philadelphia, Secretary and Treasurer.
'6o U. OF P. L. R.

657.
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When THE ORDER OF THE COIF was established at the Law
School the charter members elected to alumni membership the most
distinguished members of the classes which have graduated since the
school instituted a three-year course. A complete list of the present
membership of the chapter-alumni, faculty and undergraduateis given below:
NON-GRADUATES OF THE LAW SCHOOL.
Hon. George M. Dallas,

Professor Crawford D. Hening,

Professor William E. Mikell.
Professor John W. Patton,
GRADUATES OF THE LAW SCHOOL.
19O7.
I889.
Edward W. Evans,
David W. Amram.
i8gi.
William Draper Lewis,
George Stuart Patterson,
Charles C. Townsend.
1892.
Francis H. Bohlen.
1893.

Edward Brooks, Jr.,
Win. H. Loyd.
1894.
Henry S. Borneman,
Reynolds D. Brown.

1895.
G. Von Phul Jones.
1897.
Arthur G. Dickson,
Walter C. Douglas,
D. P. Hibberd,
John Kent Kane.
1898.
Meredith Hanna,
Owen J. Roberts.
i899.
Arthur E. Weil.
Ig00.

Thomas Cahall,
A. N. Garrett,
Charles H. Howson,
Charles L. McKeehan.
1901

Adolph T. Kohn.
Maxwell H. Kratz,
i9o8.
Paul Freeman,
T. W. Gilkyson,
W. A. S. Lapetina.
1909.

E. C. Carman,
A. E. Hutchinson,
Warren K. Miller,
J. J. Stetser.
i9io.

Ernest S. Ballard,"
Harold Evans,
Roland Heisler,
Shippen Lewis,
W. Logan MacCoy,
I. F. Porter.
1911.

Ralph J. Baker,
A. J. Davis,
G. K. Helbert.
C. E. Paxson,
H. Harrison Smith,
1912.

F. L. Ballard,
E.H. Brown,
M. A. Goldsmith,
C. L. Miller,
P. V. R. Miller,

Lester B. Johnson.

Wm. A. Schnader,

T. I. Parkinson,

Robert B. Woodbury.

H. B. Patton,
Horace Stern.
1903.
T. M. Pratt,
Morris Wolf.

1913.
W. C. Harris,
Jay F. Nusbaum,
Samuel Rosenbaum.
i9r4.

1902.

1904.
J. J. Rothschild.
1905.

E. L. Green,
Maurice B. Saul.

L. P. Scott,

N. I. S. Goldman,
G. L. Pape,
Paul N. Schaeffer,

Yale L. Schekter,
Douglass D. Storey.

NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENTIAL

TRANSFERS-The

federal Bank-

ruptcy Act of 1898,1 as amended by Act of 19o3, provides: "A
person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent,
he has, within four months before the filing of the petition .
made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such
creditors of the same class. If a bankrupt shall have given a preference, and the person receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his
agent acting therein, shall have had reasonable cause to believe that
it was intended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable by
the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such
person."
Several cases have arisen of attempts to evade this section by
agreements entered into prior to the prescribed period of four
months and consummated by the perfection of the lien within the
period; such a lien has uniformly been held to be ineffectual and a
voidable preference. An example of this occurred in the recent
case of I) re Cotton Manufacturer's Sales Company,2 where the
Sales Company prior to the four months' period, made an agreement with a bank to assign to the bank all of its accounts receivable
thereafter created, the bank agreeing to advance to the Sales Company eighty per cent. of the face value of such accounts as it approved. Thereafter, the Sales Company, within four months prior
to its bankruptcy, did assign to the bank various accounts, some of
which the bank held as collateral security for antecedent loans; at
this time, due to the circumstances, the bank was legally chargeable
with constructive notice of the insolvency of the Company. Counsel
for the bank argued that the actual assignments of the accounts refer
back for their force and effect to the date of the agreement, which
having been made more than four months before the bankruptcy,
saves all the subsequent dealings of the parties from the effect of
the bankruptcy. But the court overruled this contention and held
the assignment to be a voidable preference. This is the only proper
holding if Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act is to be more than
a mere dead letter. The theory and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
were to distribute the property which the bankrupt owned four
months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him
share and share alike, among his creditors of the same class. To
this end every judgment procured or suffered against him, every
transfer by an insolvent of any of his property, every conceivable
way of depleting it after the commencement of the four months'
period, the effect of which is to enable any one of his creditors to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class, is declared to be a voidable preference if the
§6o.
22o9

Fed.

Rep. 629 (1913).
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creditor has reason to believe that a preference is intended thereby.
An agreement to transfer is not a transfer. The title remains in the
owner unincumbered by the transfer until the transfer is effected.
When the agreement is made before, and the transfer within the
four months, the title stands unincumbered by the transfer at the
commencement of the four months, and the proceeds of that title are
pledged under the Bankruptcy Act for the benefit of all the creditors
pro rata. Any subsequent transfer withdraws the property from
these creditors, and a just and fair interpretation and execution of
the Act demands that such a transfer should be adjudged voidable
if it is otherwise so. Any other result opens a new and enticing way
to secure preference, nullifies every provision of the law to prevent
them, and invites fraud and perjury. "Hold that transfers within
four months in performance of agreements to make them before
that time do not constitute voidable preferences, and honest debtors
would agree with their favored creditors before the four months
that they would subsequently secure them by mortgage or transfers
of their property, and just before the petitions in bankruptcy were
filed they would perform their agreements. Dishonest men who
made no such contracts might falsely testify that they had done so
and thus by fraud and perjury sustain preferential transfers and
mortgages made within the four months to relatives or friends.
The great body of creditors would be left without share in the
property of their debtor and without remedy, and a law conceived
and enacted to secure a fair and equal distribution of the property
of debtors among their creditors would fail to accomplish one of
its chief objects." Such is the cogent reasoning in In re Great
Western ManufacturingCompany,3 which led the court to reject the
adoption of any such rule so fatal to the most salutary provision of
the Bankruptcy Act.
Another similar instance is the case where a debtor, more than
four months prior to bankruptcy, has given an irrevocable power of
attorney to the creditor to confess judgment, and judgment is confessed under it within four months preceding the bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court of United States has held this to be a voidable
preference.4 Likewise, mortgages executed within the four months
in performance of agreements to give them made more than four
months before the filing of the petitions in bankruptcy have been
held to be voidable preferences. 5
Y.L.S.

152 Fed. Rep. 123 (1907).
'Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191 (igoi).
'In re Sheridan, 98 Fed. Rep. 4o6 (1899) ; In re Ronk, iii Fed. Rep. x54
(igoI); In re Dismal Swamp Co., 135 Fed. Rep. 415 (9o5); Morgan v.
Nat'l Bank, 149 Fed. Rep. 466 (19o6); In re Great Western Mfg. Co.,
152 Fed. Rep. 123 (1907).

NOTES
CON'RA'TS-MuTU.LITVY-A

written contract was entered into

between the plaintiff and defendant, by the terms of which the
plaintiff agreed to purchase, and pay for, at least fifty cars at specified dates and to deposit with the defendant twelve hundred and
fifty dollars, twenty-five dollars of which was to be applied by the
defendant on the purchase price of each car when sold. In consideration thereof, the defendant allotted to the plaintiff for a certain
period, the exclusive right to solicit purchasers of, and to sell, such
cars in a specified territory. It obligated itself to furnish cars to
the plaintiff, when ordered, at certain prices and discounts, reserving
the right to change prices and discounts on two weeks' notice as
well as to refuse to accept an order if it gave at least thirty days'
notice prior to the date of delivery. In addition, each party had the
right to cancel on thirty days' notice. The plaintiff advanced the
required deposit of twelve hundred and fifty dollars and entered on
the performance of the contract. I-[e attempted to fulfill his part
of the contract, advertising the cars, and canvassing the territory;
but he was unsuccessful in making any sales during the entire contract period. After the contract had lapsed by the expiration of
this period, lie brought this action for money had and received on
the ground that the consideration had wlholly failed. The court
ruled that there could be no recovery. The action was in the nature
of an equitable action and the facts did not raise an implied promise.
on the defendant's part to repay the deposit; the defendant can
in equity and good conscience retain it. Gile v. Interstate Motor
Car Co.,

In answer to the argument that this contract was in the first
instance unenforceable as there was no mutuality, the majority opininon says, inter alia, " . . . Even conceding that the contract at

the time it was made was non-enforceable because of lack of mutuality, nevertheless the parties saw fit during the entire life of the contract to treat it as a valid and subsisting contract governing the
rights of the parties. This, of course, they had a perfect right to
do, for it is not contended that the contract was illegal and such a
one as the parties could not recognize and carry out. To the extent,
therefore, that the parties acted under and performed the same, it
is valid and enforceable and must measure their respective rights."
The question of mutuality of contract only arises in contracts
formed by the offer of a promise for a promise.2 For it is only in
the formation of such contracts that neither party to the contract
does anything further than to give his promise. If, therefore, there
is actually no promise by one of the parties, or if his promise,
though made, is void, the promise of the other party is void for
want of mutuality.3 The consideration-the mutual promise-is,
v. Inter-State Motor Car Co., 145 N. W. Rep. 732 (N. D. i9T4).
1Gile

'Page on Contracts, §302.
'Finley Shoe, etc., Co. v. Kurtz, 34 Mich. 89 (876);

Hill v. Roderick,
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in such a case, absent from the contract. Accordingly, it would
seem to be the rule, in the absence of an independent consideration,
that, where the contract does not bind one of the parties for either
a definite or indefinite time, but, by its terms, does attempt to bind
the other, the contract is not considered a mutual obligation and
is not binding upon either party unless the element of mutuality is
otherwise supplied. 4 The element of mutuality, however, may be
supplied by the person not bound doing his part thereunder; entire
performance obviates the original lack of mutuality.5
The portion of the opinion quoted brings up the question as
to whether mere lapse of the contract period, during which both
parties treat the contract as subsisting, will make the contract valid
and .enforceable, although originally it was unenforceable because
of want of mutuality. The dissenting opinion states, "Manifestly,
lapse of time alone, with no performance, could not of itself remedy
a lack of mutuality and so make a contract." The dissenting judge
cites no case in support of this conclusion, while the majority cite
several cases in support of the contrary conclusion.6 However, the
cases so cited do not beai out the conclusion of the majority opinion
on this question. The cases merely stand for the proposition that
if the contract is executed by full performance, the want of mutuality is cured; and they do not discuss what effect, if any, the lapse
of time, without more, will have upon want of mutuality.
Accordingly, it would seem that if the basis of the decision in
the principal case were entirely rested in the conclusion of the
majority opinion as to this point, the case would be doubtful, inasmuch as recent decisions seem contra.7 However, the decision
can, and should be, justified on a different and distinct groundthat an independent consideration was present in the case which
made the contract binding or at least prevented recovery of the
deposit in the equitable action of money had and received. For,
under the contract, the plaintiff acquired an important right-the
exclusive sales agency of the defendant's cars in a particular territory. It may be true that the defendant had the reserved right to
4 W. & S.

540 (1895). 22

(Pa. x842); see note to American Oil Co. v. Kirch, I5 C. C. A.

'East Line, etc., R. Co. v. Scott, 7z Tex. 70 (1888); Bolles v. Sacks,
37 Minn. 315 (1887) ; Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 Ill. 339 (1895).
'Raphael v. Hartman, 87 Ill. App. 634 (1898); Lagalourtz v. Pellman, 66
N. Y. S. 433 (19oo).
0The cases so cited are: Peoples v. Evens, 8 N. D. 121 (I898) ; Fuller v.
Rice, 52 Mich. 435 (1892) ; Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168 (1g11) ; Martinson v. Regan, 18 N. D. 467 (igog); Peoples v. Ins. Co., ix Ga. App. 177
(1913); Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 5o4 (1867).
'See 12 MIcH. L. R. No. 4,321 for recent note on similar automobile
contracts; also Buick Motor Co. v. Thompson, 138 Ga. 282 (1913); Velie
Motor Car Co. v. Klopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 Fed. Rep. 324 (1912); and
Goodyear v. Koehler Sportirig Goods Co., 143 N. Y. S. 1o46 (913).
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change price on two weeks' notice, to refuse to accept an order on
thirty days' notice before date of delivery or to cancel the contract
on thirty days' notice (the plaintiff also having this latter power).
But such reservations do not affect the question that the plaintiff
acquired some consideration and could have, in the absence of cancellation, prevented the defendant from sending a third party as
agent into his territory. This independent consideration, remaining
as the basis of the contract, made it binding in the parties.
The principal case is one of a series of recent cases in which
this question of mutuality in contracts between dealers and distributors of automobiles has arisen; the decision is therefore important
in its bearing on that question, especially since Goodyear v. Kopineier Motor Car Company is contra. It is submitted, however, that
the decision is correct on the theory that an independent consideration was present so as to take the case out of those cases which fall
because of want of mutuality.
N. I. S. G.

CORPORATIOS-N'EGOTIABILITY

OF

STOCK

CERTIFICATE-Cer-

tificates of stock had been issued by a corporation with a form of
assignment and power of attorney to make the necessary transfer
printed on the back. The owner of such a certificate, after signing
it in blank, pledges it as security for a loan to a national bank whose
cashier subsequently embezzled and appropriated it to his own use.
In an action by an innocent purchaser from the cashier, it was held'
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that, as no title passed, the
defendant as the transfer agent of the corporation is not liable either
in contract or tort for its refusal to return the certificate presented
for transfer, or to issue therefore a new certificate. It is well established that certificates of stock in a private corporation, indorsed in
blank by the persons to whom they are issued, are not negotiable
instruments, 2 and no mere usage among stockholders or others can
make them so, for no usage is good if it conflicts with an established
principal of law.' They contain, in the first place, no words of negotiability. They declare, simply, that the person named is entitled
to certain shares of stock. The general consequence of this doctrine
of non-negotiability is, that whoever takes the certificates does so
subject to its equities and burdens in the same manner as a, purchaser of any other non-negotiable paper, and though ignorant of
such equities and burdens his ignorance does not relieve 4 the papers
therefrom or enable him to hold it discharged therefrom.
'Supra, note 7.
'Barstow v. City Trust Co., zO3 N. E. Rep. giz (Mass. 1914).
'Hammond v. Hastings, 134 U. S. 401 (i8go).
'East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565 (1888).
'Mechanics' Bk. v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., I3 N. Y. 599 (1856); Young v.
South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189 (i886):
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In England the certificates are regarded as mere evidence of
ownership of stock and are neither negotiable nor quasi-negotiable.
The purchaser is never protected against equities involved in the
title of prior owners of the certificate, and only a transfer on the
corporate books shuts off those equities.' On the other hand, in
America, in view of the extensive dealings in certificates of shares
in corporate enterprises, and the interest, both of the public and of
the corporation which issues them, in making them readily transferable and convertible, some of the elements of negotiability have
been given them. ' Although most courts agree that the delivery of
the certificate with a blank power of attorney duly executed only
confers upon the holder an equitable right to effectuate a transfer
and upon surrender of the old certificate to compel the issue of a
new certificate to him ;7 yet, by putting it within the power of the
holder of the certificate to induce belief that he has a right to the
shares, the registered owner may estop himself from setting up the
legal title. This is based upon the principle, that it is more just
and reasonable, where one of two innocent parties must suffer loss,
that he should be the loser who has put trust and confidence in the
deceiver than a stranger who has been negligent in trusting no one.!
Such was the case of McNeil v. The Bank9 which holds that an
agent to whom the owner has delivered a certificate of stock duly
indorsed for transfer, with a limited power of disposition for a
special purpose, may bind the title thereto as against the true owner
by transferring it to a bona fide transferee who has no notice of the
limitations of the agent's authority, although the transfer was made
for an unauthorized purpose and with the intention on the part of
the agent to commit a fraud upon his principal.
If, however, the agent, instead of representing that the stock
is his own, admits it belonged to another for whom he claims to act,
and one lends money upon the faith of such representations, in such
case the title of the real owner who has in fact given no such
authority to act must prevail against the claim of the pledgee.' 0
Similarly where there is no agency the quasi-negotiable nature of
a stock certificate cannot be availed of."' There must be something
more than the mere intrusting to a servant of the custody of the
'Williams v. Colonial Bank, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 388 (1888); Bank v. Cady,
L. R. 15 App. Cas. 267 (18go).
"Knox v. Eden Musie Co., 148 N. Y. 44i (1896).
'Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455 (1891); In Commonwealth v.
Crompton, 137 Pa. 138 (i8go), it was said, a delivery of the certificates,
coupled with words of absolute and present gift, may invest the donee with
an equitable title to the stock. New York is apparently contra, see McNeil
v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325 (i87z).
'Allen v. Mowry & Co., 66 Ala. io (i8go).
'46 N. Y. 325 (181').
" Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Livingston, 74 N. Y.
U

Knox v. Eden Music Co.: see supra, note 6.

223

(1878).
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certificate and the consequent opportunity for theft in order to preclude the master reclaiming it, if stolen by servant and sold to
another. It may be assumed that if a corporation is not liable to
one who has given value for indorsed certificates to which an
employee was given access, the same principle would be applied
to the case of a stockholder who without negligence gives his clerk
or some other trusted person access to the indorsed certificate.
It is well settled that, in the absence of negligence, a forged
indorsement and transfer of certificates of stock cannot divest the
owner of his title. nor confer any rights, as against him, upon the
transferee; and if the corporation recognizes the forged indorsement and transfers the stock, so that the certificate is lost to the
real owner, it may be compelled to replace it, or to pay to him
its value. 2 On the same principle, an innocent purchaser of a certificate of stock indorsed in blank by the owner, and stolen from
him, or lost by him, without negligence on his part, acquires no title,
as against the owner. 13 Neither the absence of blame on the part
of the officers of the company in allowing an authorized transfer
of stock, nor the good faith of the purchaser of stolen property, will
avail as an answer to the demand of the true owner. The great
principle that no one can be deprived of his property without his
assent, except by the process of the law, requires that the property
wrongfully
transferred or stolen should be restored to its rightful
4
owner.'
It is a general rule that when the legal title to property, and the
apparent unlimited power of disposition, are vested in a person, the
rights of a purchaser from him for a valuable consideration, without
notice of a recent trust upon which the property is held, are unaffected. The purchaser in such a case requires an equity equal to
the outstanding equity of which he has no notice, and this, coupled
with the legal title, prevails against the prior equity. This principle
is applicable to transfers of certificates of stock. If a person who
holds the legal title to certificates in trust appears on the books of
the corporation as the absolute owner, a purchaser and transferee of
the certificates for value, and without actual or constructive notice
of the trust, acquires a good title, as against the cestiu que trust. 5
When, however, the certificate shows on its face that it is held in
trust, transferees are charged with notice of the trust, and with the
duty of inquiring into the authority of the holder to transfer the
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369 (1878).
" Barstow v. Savage Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388 (1883); Bangor Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Robinson, 52 Fed. Rep. 520 (1892), where it was said,
while certificates of stock indorsed in blank have a certain quasi negotiable
character, this quality does' not inhere in them to the extent of depriving
the owner of title when the certificate is stolen from him and then transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Davenport, supra, note 12.
"Winter v. Montgomery Gas Light Co., 89 Atl. Rep. 544 (1889).
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same." Thus it may be seen that the purchaser of a certificate of
stock is protected against the rights of a previous holder practically
only where such previous holder has enabled persons to sell the
stock, and consequently is estopped from claiming he did not intend
so to do. 17
S. L. M.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-FINALITY OF REGULATIONS IN TARIFF
SCHEDULES-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-BAGGAGE-The question
as to whether a common carrier, in interstate traffic, can limit its
liability to an agreed valuation, has again been passed upon favorably
in a recent decision,' where, however, the question was as to baggage,
instead of merchandise, as in the now leading case of Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger.2 An action was brought on a contract of carriage
in interstate commerce to recover from the railroad company for
the loss of certain baggage belonging to the plaintiff, which had been
transported by the defendant in interstate commerce. From the
findings of fact it appeared that the baggage was checked on a
first class ticket purchased by the plaintiff; that at the time the baggage was checked the plaintiff had no notice of the regulations hereinafter referred to limiting the liability of the defendant (further
than such notice is to be presumed from the schedules filed and
posted); that no inquiry was made by the defendant on receiving
the plaintiff's baggage as to its value; that any reasonable person
would infer from the outward appearance of the plaintiff's baggage
that the value largely exceeded one hundred dollars; that the true
value of the baggage was one thousand nine hundred four dollars
and fifty cents, and that the loss of the baggage was due to the negligence of the defendant. It was also found that the tariff schedules
filed by the defendant with the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act, and properly posted
according to law, contained provisions limiting the free transportation of baggage to a certain weight and the liability of the defendant
to one hundred dollars followed by a table of charges for excess
weight and also contained the following provision:
"For excess value the rate will be one-half of the current
excess baggage rate per one hundred pounds for each one hundred pounds, or fraction thereof, of increased value declared.
The minimum charge for excess value will be fifteen cents.
'Shaw v. Spencer, ioo Mass. 382 (i868); Gerard v. McCormick, 130
N. Y. 261 (i89); Clemens v. Heckscher, 185 Pa. 476 (1898).
" McNeil v. Bank, supra; Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. 379 (i88o); Otis v.
Gardner, 105 Ill. 436 (1883); Natl. Safe Deposit, etc., Co. v. Gray, 12 App.
D. C. 276 (898).
IB. & M. R. R. v. Hooker, decided by the United States Supreme Court,
April 6, 1914.
2226 U. S. 491 (1912).
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"Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage not to
exceed one hundred dollars in value for a passenger presenting
a full ticket and fifty dollars in value for a half ticket, unless a
greater value is declared and stipulated by the owner and excess
charges thereon paid at time of checking the baggage."
The court held that one hundred dollars was the limit of the
liability of the defendant; that the effect of the filing gives the
regulation as to baggage the force of a contract; that it was such a
regulation as was contemplated and included in the Interstate Commerce Act, and being such, and being properly filed and posted, the
plaintiff was bound thereby regardless of her knowledge of or
assent to it.
The question as to whether a common carrier could in any way
limit its common law liability and, if so, to what extent, has been the
subject of much controversy and many diverse opinions in the courts
of this country. The first rule, and one that never seemed to be
questioned was that a common carrier might, by a just and reasonable contract, relieve itself of its common law liability as an insurer.
This rule was universally recognized. But the rule was equally well
settled and almost as universally maintained, that the carrier could
not contract to relieve itself from liability for loss or damage which
was the result of its own negligence or the negligence of its servants.
There were but three jurisdictions which did not accept this rule.
In Illinois and Wisconsin the doctrine seemed to be that carriers
could, by special contract, limit their liabilities, even where the loss
or injury resulted from their own negligence, except where such
negligence was gross.3 In New York, the carrier could limit its
liability for any degree of negligence on its part, even gross negligence, provided the contract expressly provided for such exemption
or limitation, and was founded on valuable consideration. 4 Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri and Texas, by statute, and Nebraska and Kentucky, by their constitutions, prohibited contracts limiting the liability of a carrier.
At this point in the development of the law, a tendency made
its appearance to allow the carrier to limit its liability to a certain
value agreed upon between the shipper and the carrier, with certain qualifications. This tendency was first recognized and applied
in the leading case of Hart v. P. R. R.,1 and has been followed ever
'Chicago, etc., Ry Co. v. Davis, 159 Ill. 53 (895); Wabash R. R. v.
Brown, 152 Ill. 484 (1894); M. D. T. Co. v. Thielbar, 86 Ill. 71 (1877);
Black v. Goodrich Co., 55 Wis. 319 (x882); Lawson v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co.,
54 Wis. 455 (885) ; Abrams v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 87 Wis. 485 (1894).
'Nells v. N. Y. C. R. R., 24 N. Y. 18i (1862); Cragin v. N. Y. C. R. R.,
51 N. Y. 6i (1872): Westcott v. Fargo. 61 N. Y. 542 (1875); Wilson v.
N. Y. C. R. R., 97 N. Y. 87 (1884); Wynard v. Syracuse, etc., R. R., 7i
N. Y. i8o (1877).
S112 U. S. 331 (1884). The doctrine expounded in this case was ex-
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since in the federal courts and in most of the State courts. The
Pennsylvania courts have consistently 7refused to follow the Hart
Case,' and Nevada has not followed it.
In C. .l. & St. P. R. R v. Solay8 and P. R. R. v. Hughes9 it was
held that the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce comprehends power to regulate contracts between shipper
and carrier of shipments in such commerce in regard to liability for
loss or damage to articles carried, but that until Congress has legislated upon that subject, the liability of a carrier, although engaged
in interstate commerce, for loss or damage to property carried, may
be regulated by the law of the State. In I9o6 Congress passed what
is commonly known as the "Carmack Amendment" ' amending the
interstate Commerce Act. This amendment was interpreted quite
generally by the State courts as not affecting State control over contracts limiting liability.1 However, the effect of those decisions was
entirely destroyed in so far as they apply to interstate shipments, by
the United States Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 2 which decided that Congress, by the Carmack Amendment,
had taken possession of the subject and superseded all State regulations with reference to it, and that the rule of the Hart Case is
the rule to be applied in all courts.
pressly approved and enlarged upon by the Interstate Commerce Commission
in In re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. Reports, 55o (igo8).
*Hughes v. R. R., 202 Pa. 222 (19o2); Grogan v. Adams Ex. Co., 114
Pa. 523 (1886).
'Zetler v. T. & G. R. R. Co., 129 Pac. Rep. 299 (Nev. 1913).
* 169 U. S. 133 (1897). In this case a statute prohibited limitation of
liability.
'9' U. S. 477 (I9O3). Here the court held a contract limiting liability
to be invalid as against public policy.
"* Act of June 29, i9o6, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591.
' Bernard v. Adams Ex. Co., 205 Mass. 254 (19io) ; Hooker v. B. & M.,
(reversed by U. S. Supreme Court, supra, note i);
209 Mass. 598 (1911)
Greenwald v. Barrett, i99 N. Y. 170 (igio) ; Carpenter v. U. S. Express Co.,
i2o Minn. 59 (1912); Travis v. Wells-Fargo, 79 N. J. L. 83 (igog); Fielder
v. Adams Ex. Co., 69 W. Va. 138 (IgI1I); Larsen v. Oregon Short Line, 38
(reversed
Utah, 130 (i91o); Wright v. Adams Ex. Co., 23o Pa. 635 (911)
in 229 U. S. 629, 1912). These cases, however, must be considered as overruled, in so far as they apply to interstate shipments, since the decisions
in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra, note 2, and B. & M. v. Hooker,
supra, note I.
1226 U. S. 491 (1912).
The decision in this case has been followed and
applied to slightly varying facts in the following cases: Kansas City R. Co.
v. Carl, 227 U. S. 657 (i91) ; C. B. & Q. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513 (1912) ;
C. St. P. M. & 0. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519 (1912); M. K. & T. v. Harriman, 227 U. S.657 (1912); Wells, Fargo v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S.
469 (1912); C. R. I. & P. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490 (1913); G. N. Ry. v.
O'Connor, 232 U. S.5o8 (1913).
"Ford v. C. R. I. & P., 143 N. W. Rep. 249 (Minn. 1913); Barstow v.
N. Y., N. H. & H., 143 N. Y. S. 983 (N. Y. 1913).

NOTES

After the decision in the Croninger Case and previous to the
decision in the Hooker Case, two State courts, 13 at least, applied the
rule of the Hart and Croninger Cases to the limitation of baggage
liability. The decision in the Minnesota and New York cases, as
well 'as the one in the Hooker Case, would seem to be the only
logical result in view of the line of cases, interpreting the Interstate
Commerce Act, decided during the last decade. It must be remembered that the decision in the Croninger Case did not necessarily
decide anything as to baggage liability, but merely upheld the validity of a provision in a bill of lading limiting liability, and decided
that federal rules rather than State rules govern the validity of such
contracts. In the Hooker Case the question was not as to whether a
contract limiting liability was valid, but rather as to whether the
shipper was bound by a limitation of liability for baggage, regardless
of his knowledge of or assent to it, merely by reason of the fact
that such limitation was filed and posted as a part of the carrier's
schedules for passenger traffic; or, in other words, whether the limitation, filed and posted as part of the schedules, became an essential
part of the rate from which the .carrier must not deviate, and of
which the shipper was bound to take notice; thus giving the regulation the force of a contract determining baggage liability.
As has been stated the holding in the principal case seems to be
the only logical one that could have been expected in view of the
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act. The cases up to and including
the year 191o have been very ably analyzed by Professor Henry
Wolf Bikl in an article"4 in which the present decision is predicted.
In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg' 5 it was held that "Whatever may be the rate agreed upon, the carrier's lien on the goods is,
by force of the act of Congress, for the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates and charges, and this lien can be discharged,
and the consignee can become entitled to the goods, only by the
payment, or tender of payment, of such amount." In T. & P.
Rzy. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 6 it was held that the rate, when
made out and filed, is notice. The shipper must take notice of the
rate applicable and actual want of knowledge is no excuse. Where
the rates charged were duly filed with the Commission, according to
the act, and had not been found to be unreasonable by the InterState Commerce Commission, no action could be maintained at
the common law in a State court for unreasonable freight rates. A
shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of
the established rate must primarily invoke redress through the Commission, which body alone is vested with power originally to enter""The Jurisdiction of Certain Cases Arising Under the Interstate Commerce Act," 6o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW I (October, 1911).
I202 U. S. 242 (1905).
"'204 U. S. 426 (r9o6).

642

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

tain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule. When
once a rate has been filed and published it is binding and the allegation of unreasonableness is not sufficient to give the courts any
jurisdiction whatever. In Poor Grain Co. v. C. B. & QY Mr. Commissioner Harlan says, "When once lawfully published, a rate, so
long as it remains uncanceled, is as fixed and unalterable, either by
the shipper or by the carrier as if that particular rate had been
established by a special act of Congress. When regularly published
it is no longer the rate imposed by the carrier, but the rate imposed
by the law."
So long as the Commission has kept within the powers conferred
by the act, the findings of that body are not subject to be reviewed
by the courts, nor are its orders open to attack in the courts.18 The
courts are limited to the question of the power of the Commission
to make the order1 9and cannot consider the wisdom or expediency
of the order itself.
In Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside M~ill" it was held that the
Interstate Commerce Act makes the initial carrier liable for any loss,
damage or injury to the property, not only for its own negligence
but for that of any agency which it may use, notwithstanding provisions in the bill of lading to the contrary. Later it was held that
legislation by Congress in regard to matters of interstate commerce
need. not be inhibitive, but need only occupy the field,
21 in order to
supersede State statutes and rules on the same subject.
C. & A. R. R. v. Kirby22 held that a contract for special service
or higher responsibility must be set forth in the published tariffs
and open to all; if not so done it is illegal discrimination and is invalid. From this it would seem to follow that no contract asserting
fresh liability or limiting liability would be held good unless the
terms are set forth in the published tariffs, and, further, that when
a contract is published in the filed schedules, no court can consider
or decide whether the contract is unreasonable or against public
policy, but that this power is alone in the Interstate Commerce
Commission, just as though the regulation were a rate, and that when
the regulation is once in the filed and published schedules it is as
binding in every particular to the same extent as a rate would be.
In Adams Ex. Co. v. Croninger" the court said, "The knowledge of the shipper that the rate was based upon the value is to be
1

12 I. C. C. Rep. 418, 422 (1907).

So. Pac. Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 433 (I9IO).
"I. C. C. v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 215 U. S. 452 (19o9); B. & 0. v. Pitcairn
Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481 (igo9).
" 219 U. S. 186 (igio).
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1911); Southern Ry.
v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (1911); Mondow v. R. R., 223 U. S. 1 (1911); Adams
Ex. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1912).
"225 U. S.155 (191).
"226 U. S. 491, 509 (1912).

NOTES

presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published
schedules filed with the Commission." And in Al. K. & T. R. R.
24
it was said that the shipper was compelled to take
v. Harriman
notice of the rate sheets contained in tariff schedules, "not only because referred to in the contract signed by them, but because they
had been lawfully filed and published." In C. R. I & P. v. Cremer21
the court said, "The provisions of the tariff enter into and form a
part of the contract of shipment."
Hence we see that in the Abilene Oil Case a rate, when duly
filed, is valid and binding and is notice to the shipper; in the Kirby
Case we see that a contract, to be valid, must be set forth in the
tariffs and duly filed; in the Croninger Case the knowledge of the
shipper of the filed schedules is presumed; in the Harriman
Case the shipper was compelled to take notice of the rate sheets in
the tariff because they had been lawfully filed; in the Cramer Case
we see that the provisions of the tariff form a part of the contract
of shipment, and now finally in the [looker Case the court has said
that regulations incorporated in the tariff and properly filed are of
as binding effect and as little open to adjudication by the courts as
are the rates themselves.
C. McA. S.
LIBEL-CtIARGE OF ILLEGITIMACY IN A WILL-LIABILITY OF
EXECUTOR FOR PUBLICATION BY PROBATE-The Supreme Court of

Tennessee has recently, in the case of Harris v. Nashville Trust
Company, adjudicated a case of first impression and, incidentally,2
has furnished one more instance in vindication of the staunch claim
of malleability and competency of common law jurisprudence and
procedure to adjust itself to new forms of action as necessity shall
require.
Plaintiff, a niece of the testator, had been involved in some litigation against the latter in regard to certain family estates under
his administration. When the will was probated the following provision appeared, "And this sum of $250 to J. W., $I.00 to W. W.,
and $i.oo to Cleo XV., the illegitimate children of'my brother James
W., is all that they are ever to have of my estate." Cleo IV. Harris,
one of those designated in the above provision, brought an action
for damages against the executor to recover damages on account of
the libel against her contained in the testator's will and published by
24227 U. S. 657, 669 (1912).
See also K. C. S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639
(1912), and Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469 (1912).
2232 U. S. 490 (19T3).
See also Great Northern Ry. Co. v. O'Connor,

232 U. S. 508 (r913).

' i62 S. W. Rep. 584 (T954).
'Jacob v. State, 3 111nph. 493 (Tenn. 1842); Kujek v. Goldman. i5o
N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. Rep. 77"3 (1896) ; Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393 (1876).
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probate of the will. The charge of illegitimacy was denied. The
court declared that a tort had certainly been committed with regard
to the rights of this plaintiff; that to traduce one's private reputation is a breach of the legal duty one owes to another, and is actionable: that it is libelous per se to charge one in print or writing with
being illegitimate. "No more effective means of publishing and perpetuating a libel can be conceived than to secure the inscription of
such matter on court records, as by probate of a will. The libel
in this case

.

.

.

will be of widespread circulation.

This testa-

tor was the owner of considerable real estate, and every time a transfer of the property is made and an examination of title necessitated,
this will must be scrutinized, and the libel thus published will be
called to the notice of parties interested.

The stigma

.

.

.

will

thus be made conspicuous for years to come." So far so good, the
case of injury to the plaintiff has certainly been made out; the difficulty arises in fastening liability on the defendant, the executor as
such.
In ruling that there was a liability on the executor as such the
court referred to the liability of a principal who has given authority
to publish a libel and the agent has made publication in substantial
accord with his authority, concluding that "the publication of this
libel was made by the agent, the executor, in literal pursuance of
the authority given; that is to say, it was made by the probate of the
testator's will." This reasoning can hardly be said to meet the
issue presented. In the first place the principle of agency referred
to was evolved from and is applicable to actions for libel against
living defendant tort feasors. But if this theory of agency is advanced here as a controlling analogy, the court has assumed an essential point in the case for liability; for, with regard to agency in the
broad sense, death of the principal terminates the authority, so
the rule, on that ground, would seem to present an anomaly in the
liability of a principal. Again, if the court is considering the office
of executor to be a peculiar and special kind of agency, i.e., an
appointment by the testator in his lifetime of the one who shall be
(executor and) agent for him and after his death for the purpose
of preserving, marshalling and distributing his estate as he wishes,
according to, and by grace of, the law-then, it would seem, that
an exposition of the relationship, its liabilities and limitations,
broader than the mere statement of its existence would be necessary,
in view of the fact that such a principle can hardly be said to be
prominent in the cases defining the authority of an executor. This
is especially true with regard to the tort for libel, since it is peculiarly
one of personal injury. There is another reason why the theory
of agent can hardly be said to cover the question involved in the
principal case; the case is novel-the scandalous words were written
by the testator in his lifetime; the publication is by the executor
after the testator's death. The cause of action was not complete in
the testator's lifetime, since there was no publication; and the court's

NOTES

view, that the maxim actio personalis moritur curn persona does not
apply, is irrefutable. The second element necessary to the maintenance of action for libel, viz., publication, is not present until after
the testator's death when the executor acts by having the will probated. Thus the case stands astride the two great fields of action to
which an executor is answerable in his official capacity, having an
element traceable to each yet complete in neither, viz., (i) actions
upon liabilities or obligations accruing in the lifetime of the testator, as obligations arising from records, recognizances, statutory
penalties, quavi-contracts, contracts express or implied, specialties,3
etc., and (2) actions against the executor with regard to title, torts
with regard to the estate, actions in rem, contracts broken by provisions of the will, etc.4 In the conclusion of the opinion the court
makes one statement that would seem to show a truer ground of liability than that of agency as discussed in the body of the opinion.
After referring to the liability of an executor in his official capacity
for contracts breached by the provisions of the will, it is said, "If
by will he (testator) commits a tort there seems to be no good reason
why his executor and his estate should not likewise be held accountable." The position of the court is unquestionably wholesome and
just. A new situation was presented, an injury done in a way that
.the law has seldom, so far as the cases show, been called upon to
redress. 4 a To rule that redress might be had from the estate of the
perpetrator, and recompense be given to the injured, without doing
violence to any of the established rules of law, will have an effective
and salutary influence on intending indulgers in this not infrequent
despicable method of injuring innocent persons through scandalous
statements made in wills.
At first glance the case seems to stand in direct opposition to
the maxim relating to non-survival of causes of action for tort upon
which the defense rested. In discussing this the court, after showing that had no application to the case, reviewed in an interesting
way the development, scope and limitations of the doctrine, referring to it as obscure in origin and resting upon adjudication in fact,
"barbarous." "It has no champion at this date, nor has any judge
or law writer risen to defend it for two hundred years." The court
also discusses, as additional ground for its desire to afford relief in
this field of cases, the practical limitations placed on the doctrine by
Lord Mansfield's decision in 1776 in the case of Hambly v. Trott,
where the remedy of assumpsit in quasi-contract was laid down to
be concurrent with certain tort actions, and to survive against the
executor. And as a final protest against the force of the maxim,
'Williams on Executors, ioth Ed., BIK.

2, Ch. I, p. 1346, et seq.
"Ibid.. 1353, et seq.
'&The point has been discussed in the Orphans' Court of Allegheny
County, Pa. Gallagher's Estate, io Pa. D. R. 733 (i91).
&I Cowp. 373, 98 English Reprint, 1136.
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the court pointed to the well-nigh universal passage of statutes providing for the survival of certain tort actions begun by or against
the decedent,6 and
to those providing for original institution by his
7
representatives.
It may be interesting to test the result of this decision by the
principles of the Roman law; that is the principle of "universal succission." The person or persons who succeeded did not simply
represent the deceased, but they continued his civil life, his legal
existence. With the Romans it seemed a simple and natural process
to eliminate the fact of death from the devolution of rights and
obligations." The testator lived on in his heir; he was in law the
same person with them. The rights and obligations which attached
to the deceased head of the house would attach, without breach of
continuity, to his successorY In Roman law the term "obligation"
included both contract, in all its form, and delict or wrong. Both
descended to the successor and remained assets or liabilities, as the
case might be.10 Thus it will be seen that any jurisdiction influenced
by the principles of the Roman law would rule the principal case to
the same conclusion as did the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
Another point of interest in the case was the dictum of the
court that there could be no personal liability fastened on the executor upon the facts as presented; that he was under legal duty to
probate the will; that he would be criminally responsible for suppression of it. But, quaere, in view of the jurisdiction of the courts
of equity and of probate to strike out scandalous matters from pleadings and records and wills, would the executor have any defense
to the action? The jurisdiction mentioned was well defined in the
English Ecclesiastical Courts," was recognized in Court of Probate
in England ;12 and though no adjudicated case can be found in the
American reports, it probably exists. There is no reason to be advanced against the exercise of it by our courts of equity and of
probate. And if such proceedings may be had to remove scurrilous
and scandalous parts from wills, there remains no justification for
an executor to plead compulsion of law to libel an innocent party.
"E. g., in Pennsylvania, Act April 15, 1851, §r8, P. L. 669, providing for
survival of certain actions in tort where plaintiff dies; and Act June 24,
I895, P. L. 236, providing for survival of certain action in tort where the
defendant dies during suit.
'E. g., in Pennsylvania, Act April I5, 1851, §19, P. L. 669, and as amended
Act April 26, 1855, P. L 309.
'Maine, "Ancient Law," 182, 183.
'Ibid., 179.
"Ibid., 313, 314; Hunter "Roman Law," 126, et seq.
'Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams, 33 (Eng. 1825); In re Wartnaby, i Rob.
Ecc. 423 (Eng. 1846).
"Marsh v. Marsh, i Sw. & Tr. 528 (Eng. 186o) ; In re Honywood, L. R.
2 Prob. & Div. 25T (Eng. 1871).

NOTES

True, the words were written by another; the probate is compulsory;
but probate of a harmless, not an injurious instrument. And, above
all, in cases like this, where the injurious and offensive matter may
be removed without violence to or effect upon the determination and
validity of the bequest.
J.C.A.
PATENTS-RIGHTS UNDER CONFLICTING DECISIONs-As the
Circuit Courts are not bound by each other's decrees, a prior adjudication of a patent will not determine its status in another circuit,'
and it not infrequently happens that the same patent is held invalid,
or not infringed by a certain device in one circuit and valid and infringed by an identically similar device in another circuit. Until the
decision of Kessler v. Eldred,2 it was generally believed (though
there were no adjudicated cases on the point) that the validity or
invalidity of a patent was limited by the geographical boundaries of
the circuit where the decree was rendered, and that an article, made
under a decree declaring a patent invalid, could not be sold in another
circuit where the patent had been held valid. This at least afforded
a workable rule.
In that case, however, Eldred, the owner of the Chambers
patent for electric cigar lighters, sued Kessler in the Northern District of Indiana, where it was held that Kessler's lighter did not
infringe. Subsequently a similar lighter made by Kirkland in the
Second Circuit was held to infringe. Eldred then sued Breitweiser,
who was using Kessler's lights in the Second Circuit. But Kessler
obtained a decree enjoining Eldred from prosecuting anyone for
infringement of the Chambers patent by purchase, use or sale of the
lighters made by Kessler. The United States Supreme Court held
on certiorarithat Kessler had the right to manufacture and sell his
lighters throughout the United States and that a suit against3 any
customer of his was a wrongful interference with his business.
The decision is strictly limited to the rights of the successful
infringer, the court expressly refusing to determine whether his
1Mast v. Stover, 177 U. S. 485 (i9oo); Welsbach v. Cosmopolitan, 104
Fed. Rep. 83 (igoo); Imperial v. Crown, 139 Fed. Rep. 312 (19o5); 18
HARv. L. REV. 217.
22o6 U. S. 285 (i9o6).

'This doctrine includes interference with customers in a foreign country;
Goodyear Tire Co. v. Rubber Tire Co., 164 Fed. Rep. 869 (i9o8), and allows
an injunction to prevent an interference pendente lite; Commercial Co. v.
Avery Lighting Co., 159 Fed. Rep. 935 (i9o8), but does not include the sale
of any infringing article made in this district where the .patent was held
invalid; Consolidated Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 677 (1907).
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customers had any rights in themselves or not,4 and has resulted in

5
the utmost uncertainty and confusion.
Probably no better example of the present chaotic state of the
law can be found than the cases involving the Grant patent. This
was a patent for a solid rubber tire composed of three elements: (i)
a channel or groove with tapered or inclined sides, (2) a rubber tire
with a described shape, adapted to fit into the channel, and (3) a
fastening device consisting of independent retaining wires which
7
pass through the tire. In the Sixth" and Seventh Circuits the
held
was
the
patent
Circuit
the
Second
In
patent was held void.
valid." The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the last
decision in this circuit that the patent was valid and infringed by the
defendant.0 In the decree, however, it was specifically stated that
the injunction was not to prevent the defendant from using and
selling the tires made by the Goodyear Company and the Kokomo
Company under the prior decrees in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 10
The question then arose between the exclusive licensee of the
patentee and a purchaser in the Second Circuit from the Kokomo

'Though if the manufacturer will undertake the defense of its customer
it brings the case within the rule, Marshall v. Bryant Electric Co., 185 Fed.
Rep. 499 (191I), affirming 169 Fed. Rep. 426 (19o9).

'In commenting on the situation Macombe in The Fixed Law of Patents
(2nd Ed., p. 5) says: "The decision in Kessler v. Eldred, 2o6 U. S. 285, is
a step which does little more than add confusion to uncertainty ...
Here then is the situation in part at least: If one buys a cigar-lighter from
Kessler in Illinois or anywhere else he may use it anywhere, even in the
Second Circuit where the patent has been held valid. If one buys that cigar
lighter from another maker than Kessler, he may use it in the Seventh Circuit and not infringe; but if he brings it into the Second Circuit and uses it
he at once infringes. If one makes such a lighter in the Second Circuit he
infringes; but he may carry it into the Seventh Circuit and use it freely.
If a user of such cigar lighter were sued in the Second Circuit by Eldred
for infringement of his patent and an injunction asked, the court would
exclude from the restriction (as was done in the case of Consolidated v.
Diamond) all lighters made by Kessler. What might happen in any one of
the other seven circuits one may only surmise."
'Goodyear Co. v. Rubber Co., i16 Fed. Rep. 363 (19o2); Rubber Co. v.
Victor Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 85 (19o3).
'The Circuit Court of the district of Indiana in the case of the Consolidated Co. v. Kokomo, not reported, dismissed the complaint upon the
pleadings, testimony and exhibits for want of equity, no opinion being written.
The case was then appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit and thereupon dismissed.
'Consolidated Co. v. Finley Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 629 (I90); Consolidated
Co. v. Firestone Co., 147 Fed. Rep. 739 (19o6); affirmed on appeal in I5i
Fed. Rep. 237 (1907); Consolidated Co. v. Diamond Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 678
(igo7), and on rehearing, 162 Fed. Rep. 892 (1908).
'Consolidated Co. v. Diamond Co., 220 U. S. 428 (T9II).
0 But the court refused to decide whether the defendant could use and
sell its own tires in the circuits where the patent had been held invalid.

NOTES
Company. The Circuit Court adopted the view that the decision in
Eldred v. Kessler was purely one of res judicata and that inasmuch
as the prior decree in favor of the Kokomo Company was purely in
personani it could not be taken advantage of by its assignee."

But

the Circuit Court of Appeals being in doubt as to whether this was
the correct interpretation or not, certified to the United States Supreme Court 12 the question as to whether, in view of the subsequent
holding of that court, the Kokomo Company had the right, as demanded by them, to manufacture and sell infringing tires everywhere free from the monopoly of the patent; and if so were its
vendees immune from prosecution by the owners of the patent.
The determination of these questions would obviously have gone
a long way towards clearing up the situation. Nevertheless the
Court refused to decide the questions and distinguished the case on
the narrow ground that the defendants did not purchase the patented article from the Kokomo Company but made it themselves,
since they merely bought the rubber from the Kokomo Company
and used their own metal channels and retaining wires. 13 The same
was held to be true where the defendants having bought the rubber
only from the Kokomo Company sold the rubber and iron and
wires to their purchasers to assemble.1" It is to be noted, however,
that in this case the sole ground on which the patent was sustained,
was that the elements only when assembled produced a patentable
combination, but each alone was old, and therefore the decision is
probably an extremely narrow one.
In view of the obvious reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to determine these questions finally and the absolute
impossibility of any uniform ruling being reached through the Circuit Courts, since the decrees of one are not binding in another, it
is submitted that the necessity for a Court of Patent Appeals is
almost imperative.
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